All use cases

Session hijacking

Catch a stolen session token being replayed from a different device by checking that the Visitor ID stays continuous through an authenticated session, and flag mid-session jumps in IP or location.

Overview

Session hijacking is the theft and reuse of a valid session token, the cookie or token a browser stores after login and replays on every request so the user does not have to sign in again. It targets the output of authentication rather than the inputs, which is what makes it so dangerous: a stolen password can be stopped by a second factor, but a stolen session token has already cleared MFA, so to the application a hijacked session is just the real user continuing their day. Attackers obtain tokens several ways, most prevalently infostealer malware that silently reads cookies from browser storage and exfiltrates them within minutes, but also adversary-in-the-middle phishing that grabs the cookie after MFA completes, cross-site scripting, and interception over compromised networks. Stolen tokens surface on underground markets within a day or two and are simply loaded into the attacker's own browser. Because the token alone is enough, login-time defenses never get a second look, and this is a serious exposure anywhere a session unlocks real value, including fintech and banking, ecommerce, SaaS, and gaming and gambling.

What separates this from credential or login attacks is that it happens entirely after authentication, so detection has to watch the session rather than the sign-in. The recognized fixes are short token lifetimes with rotation, binding the session to the device it was issued on so a token replayed elsewhere is rejected, and continuous context evaluation that keeps checking whether the active session still looks like the same user. A persistent Visitor ID is what makes device binding practical: record the Visitor ID present when the session was established, then revalidate it on sensitive requests, and a token suddenly arriving from a different Visitor ID is a replay from another device even though the token itself is valid. IP Geolocation adds the second, independent angle the session view depends on, catching a mid-session jump to a far-off location or impossible travel, where a session authenticated in one place continues from another minutes later. When either fires, the response is to force re-authentication or terminate the session rather than trust the token, with VPN and proxy detection adding context on whether the new origin is masked. On top of that, Fingerprint flags replayed identification requests, so a captured identification result that an attacker tries to reuse is caught.

How to implement it

  • Record the Visitor ID present when a session is established, then revalidate it on sensitive requests so a token arriving from a different Visitor ID is caught as a replay from another device.

  • Use IP Geolocation to flag a mid-session jump to a distant location or impossible travel, where a session authenticated in one place continues from another minutes later.

  • Force re-authentication or terminate the session when the Visitor ID or location breaks continuity, rather than trusting a token that is technically still valid.

  • Use VPN and Proxy Detection to add context on whether a new mid-session origin is being masked.

Which signals to check

Also known as

session hijacking · session token theft · cookie theft · cookie hijacking · session replay · token replay · session cookie theft

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